Automate access, reduce risk, and stay audit-ready
Non-human identities (NHIs) are machine credentials such as service accounts, API keys, certificates, and workload identities that enable automated system-to-system communication. Non-human identity management (NHIM) secures these credentials through discovery, least privilege enforcement, credential rotation, and continuous monitoring.
Non-human identities (NHIs) are digital credentials that embody machines, applications, and automated processes in IT infrastructure, primarily enabling them to authenticate and consume resources on their own, with no human assistance. While human identities are generally connected to individual users, NHIs enable machine-to-machine interaction and are designed to complete repetitive tasks across cloud-native and on-premises environments autonomously. This includes service accounts, API keys, OAuth tokens, certificates, and workload identities that are the backbone of the automated workflows that enterprises count on today. When your payment application connects to the database at 3 AM, when CI/CD pipelines push code to production, or when microservices in Kubernetes talk thousands of times per second, NHIs are managing and automating complex interactions.
Gartner research shows that in a typical cloud environment, NHIs outnumber human identities 45:1. For every employee account that is typically formally managed through an HR process, there are 45 service accounts, API keys, and certificates with minimal to no oversight.
This causes major issues. When security incidents occur, it is because service accounts are using systems without enterprise inventory. When a compliance audit occurs, the organization cannot provide records authorizing which service accounts have access to financial data. When SOX or HIPAA reviews occur, compliance officers realize that service accounts do not receive access certifications every quarter.
For CISOs, IT directors, compliance officers, and HRIS leads, deciphering non-human identity security represents a significant capability gap that needs to be addressed immediately.
A non-human identity, or NHI, is a digital entity that facilitates machine-to-machine access and authentication within software ecosystems. NHIs are ascribed to applications, bots, devices, or workloads, enabling them to log in and act in an automated fashion without a human supervising each action. When a human uses or accesses the software system, they decide to log in. NHIs rely upon programmatic logic whereby the application code determines when and how to access resources automatically.
Access is granted to NHIs through various forms of authentication, including secrets (access keys, passwords), certificates (digital certificates for TLS/SSL), and tokens (OAuth tokens, bearer tokens). One example of an NHI is an application with a service account that authenticates to a cloud-based application such as AWS or Azure. The application utilizes secrets, certificates, or tokens to authenticate as a service account defined at the time the service account was created and granted permissions. Another example could be using an API key to connect to third-party software such as Stripe or Twilio to perform operations. The NHI applications, or bots, access data and perform actions based on what was requested or permitted to be done by the assigned service account and role/permissions.
With NHIs, here is where things can become problematic; the access that is granted for NHIs is usually defined only by the required interactions and typically is more permissive than what human users are required to work under or under the permissions/horizon.
Grasping the core aspects of different types of identities for humans and machines is a key consideration for effectively governing identity. Human identities, whose creation is intentional (through HR processes) and assigned to a specific individual, are quite different than those that we consider non-human identities, whose creation is based on machine-to-machine processes in a highly iterative and automated way as an application is deployed and infrastructure provisioned.
Human identities in the context of Identity and Access Management (IAM) refer to identifiers like usernames and associated personal attributes assigned to a human being. This all relates to the administration of 'security controls' that track user actions, establish permissioning models based on a set of users' roles, and establish personal accountability for the actions they take in a system or systems.
'Non-human', 'service account system' or 'machine identity' refers to an actor that is not human but would instead be thought of as or authenticate as a credential that would be used for apps or applications to talk to one another to perform a task. The management of these types of identities is critical because they manage communication securely with other apps or systems and human developers and provide system-level accountability to the system processes that take place at the application layer.
The major differentiation should be conceptually simple: human identities are tied to human users and their human attributes (or personal attributes), i.e., name, department, job role, manager, etc.; non-human identities are tied, as the name implies, are associated with systems or applications whose function is not connected to personal attributes or individual behavior.
| Aspect | Human Identities | Non-Human Identities |
|---|---|---|
| Lifecycle Trigger | HR events (hire/terminate) | Application deployment/retirement |
| Authentication | Password + MFA, biometrics | API keys, certificates, tokens |
| Access Pattern | Business hours, intermittent | 24/7 continuous automated |
| Ownership | Specific employee | Ambiguous (team/app-owned) |
| Volume | 1x baseline | 45x (Gartner) |
| Deprovisioning | Automatic | Manual, often forgotten |
Lifecycle management is driven by a much different set of triggers. Human identities will follow the normal rules of employment, where HR systems such as Workday or SAP SuccessFactors will initiate provisioning once a new employee is hired and deprovisioning once they exit the company. NHI lifecycles will almost always be tied to technical events, such as deploying applications, provisioning infrastructure, or configuring services. The primary gap occurs when applications are truly retired or services are deprecated; no system automatically removes the users' credentials, leading to orphaned accounts indefinitely.
Authentication models are active rather than an interactive event. In the case of human identities, users will be prompted to log in, approve MFA notifications, biometrics, etc. NHIs will simply leverage manufactured and dormant/embedded authentication mechanisms. API keys are developed and embedded into the HTTP request header, service accounts will operate against Kerberos tickets or NTLM authentication mechanisms, code and/or certificates will prove identity through public-key cryptography, and OAuth flows use client credentials and access tokens without any users physically present to approve the transaction.
Access patterns demonstrate remarkably different behaviors. Human users will typically access systems during business hours from locations they can identify with labor-like activity patterns and predictable access. Automated processes, or service accounts, are typically active continuously and can authenticate thousands of times per hour from multiple server endpoints at the same time. This continuous activity 24/7 makes automated machine anomaly detection extremely difficult because what is an indicator of a compromised human account (a late-night access or a high rate of authentication) is normal behavior for automated processes.
According to the IBM 2024 Cost of a Data Breach Report, breaches resulting from compromised credentials typically take about 250 days to identify. The detection of a compromise of machine credentials typically takes longer to identify due to the baseline of user behavior being poorly understood, and security teams usually do not have visibility or understanding of what is classified as "normal" for machine activity.
Non-human identities authenticate using programmatic, non-interactive methods rather than passwords and MFA prompts.
Common NHI Authentication Methods:
Unlike human authentication, these methods operate continuously without manual approval, increasing the need for automated governance.
Common examples of non-human identities include:
In modern cloud environments, these machine identities often outnumber human identities by 30–45x.
Service accounts are accounts with privileges that are created to be used to run applications and services instead of for individual users. On Windows, applications run under predefined accounts like NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM or user-defined accounts like DOMAIN\svc_payroll. On Unix/Linux, daemon processes run under accounts like postgres (database), jenkins (CI/CD), or www-data (web server). These accounts automatically authenticate when the service starts and have the technical permissions the application requires.
The biggest challenge is permission accumulation. A service account that originally only needed read access to the database may have received write permissions as part of troubleshooting, but it is rare for those permissions to be revoked. In the cloud, this problem has extended well beyond the operating system with Azure Service Principals, AWS IAM Roles, or Google Cloud Service Accounts, which share the same processes by providing temporary credentialing automatically instead of a static password.
API keys are proprietary identifiers that applications include in requests to authenticate themselves when making requests to external services. When your organization signs up for a service, such as Stripe, which is an online payment processor, or Twilio, which is an SMS platform, that service provides your application with an API key to include in each request. If any person has your API key, they can impersonate your application and gain access to your data.
OAuth tokens offer a much safer, time-limited access token (generally an hour or less) for your application instead of a long-term key. Organizations should track usage of API keys continuously, rotate keys automatically every 90 days to manage API keys securely, and apply the least privilege security principle.
Digital certificates leverage PKI to verify identity and secure communications. TLS/SSL certificates secure web traffic by proving identity and encrypting data on the server side. Client certificates are used to authenticate applications in mutual TLS, where both the client and server provide a certificate for authentication before exchanging any messages. Code signing certificates verify whether software or applications have been tampered with.
The operational conundrum is lifecycle management. Most modern certificates expire after a maximum of 90 days, which means that they'll either need to be manually – or automatically – replaced at or before that expiration to avoid interruptions in service availability. Indeed, organizations will need to track these expiration windows against deployments that can number in the thousands. Expired certificates have already caused outages for many large companies, including Microsoft Teams and LinkedIn.
SSH keys enable authentication on servers without a password using public-private key pairs. The server keeps the public key, while the client proves ownership of a private key without sending it over the wire. DevOps workflows utilize SSH keys to automate tasks, such as connecting Ansible to hundreds of server clusters via SSH. Developers use SSH keys for Git authentication.
The security issue is that keys can last forever. Unlike passwords, which have an expiration date, SSH keys do not. For example, a developer created an SSH key to enter a production server 5 years ago. The developer left the company 3 years ago, but the key still works. The organization may run into a situation where there are 50 or more public keys on a server, and there is no documentation of which key is still needed.
Cloud workload identities are credentials assigned automatically to compute resources available on cloud platforms, eliminating the need for stored passwords. For example, AWS IAM instance profiles apply to EC2 instances. Applications fetch temporary credentials from an instance metadata service, which are available only from that instance and rotate every few (e.g., every 2 or 6) hours. Azure Managed Identities, Google Cloud Service Accounts, and Kubernetes Service Accounts work similarly.
With no stored credentials, we are left with no credentials to leak, via configuration files or via code repositories. The security challenge becomes managing the actual permissions. Organizations must ensure that workload identities remain least privileged, meaning that applications get only the specific permissions they need, versus blanket administrative permissions.
RPA (Robotic Process Automation) bots serve to automate business functions by interacting with applications via the end-user experience in the user interface, instead of through APIs. Tools like UiPath or Automation Anywhere, for example, allow a bot to log into applications, click buttons, navigate menus, and enter data just like a human. For example, an RPA bot that automates the process of processing invoices may log into email to download an invoice, look up vendor information, use the company's ERP system to check on purchase orders, and update the tracking spreadsheet.
The catch is that bots need user-equivalent credentials, meaning the bots need an account with equal access to the system as the human employee. Bots also generally bypass MFA, as they cannot approve a push notification or scan a fingerprint. As a result, organizations need to exempt bot accounts from MFA, making the username and password the only form of authentication. If they are compromised, hackers get to use all of the same access to applications and sensitive data as an employee.
Cloud applications depend on non-human identities for automation that human credentials cannot provide.
"Cloud workload identities" refer to the credentials automatically assigned to compute resources – like virtual machines, containers, and serverless functions – by cloud platforms on behalf of the user. The benefit is that the user does not need to store a password (or the cloud provider is not storing the password).
Organizations implemented automation faster than they developed governance capabilities. According to Gartner, machine identities now outnumber human identities 45:1 in typical cloud environments. Despite this dramatic imbalance, most identity governance budgets focus almost exclusively on user accounts, creating a critical blind spot where the vast majority of digital identities receive minimal oversight.
Over-permissioning occurs when service accounts are assigned more permissions than what is needed. Development teams request access to the database, and administrators provide full database owner permissions instead of limiting it to the table for troubleshooting: the service deploys, and teams never look at those permissions again. Five years later, the service account now has database owner permissions and file system permissions, and is a member of administrative groups that are never removed.
According to CyberArk, 42% of service accounts have administrative privileges. Datadog reports 78% of cloud IAM roles have unused permissions. Mitigation requires permission usage analysis using tools like AWS IAM Access Analyzer to identify permissions granted but never used. Policy-based provisioning prevents over-permissioning by mapping applications to predefined permission templates. Regular access certification prompts owners to review and justify permissions.
Developers embed credentials directly in source code, configuration files, or container images because it's the fastest way to make code work during development. These hardcoded secrets then move from development into production systems. Credentials in Git repositories persist in version history even after deletion. Passwords in .env files propagate across environments. Dockerfile credentials exist in image layers. Application logs capture connection strings.
According to GitGuardian, over 10 million secrets are exposed in public repositories annually. IBM reports 19% of breaches involve compromised credentials. Organizations need secrets management vaults like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Azure Key Vault, where applications retrieve credentials at runtime instead of storing them. Pre-commit scanning tools like git-secrets scan commits for credentials and reject any containing secrets before they reach repositories.
Machine identities lack the natural lifecycle triggers that human identities have. When employees leave, HR systems automatically disable their accounts. When applications are decommissioned, nobody remembers to remove the associated service accounts, API keys, and SSH keys. These orphaned credentials persist indefinitely with full permissions despite serving no purpose.
According to CyberArk, 68% of organizations cannot accurately inventory their service accounts. Monitoring tools designed for 10,000 human users struggle with 450,000 machine identities. SOCs monitor human users but view service accounts as "just infrastructure" without clear ownership. Mitigation requires automated discovery, continuously identifying service accounts across infrastructure, ownership assignment linking every credential to responsible teams, and lifecycle integration that provisions credentials when applications deploy and deprovisions them when applications retire.
"Shadow identities" refers to credentials that developers generate outside any formal governance processes. DevOps emphasizes speed and autonomy, so when developers require credentials, they directly generate them via cloud consoles or CI/CD tools rather than through any approval workflow. For example, if a developer needs an S3 bucket, they log into AWS, create an IAM role, and are done within 15 minutes. This credential now exists in production, while the security teams are unaware that it exists at all.
These shadow credentials create permission drift (development teams grant permissions that seem necessary, but without any security review), orphaned accounts (no one remembers these accounts years later), "no rotation" (there's no tracking of these accounts, so there's no concept of a rotation schedule), and potential compliance violations (if you do not keep track of access, you cannot demonstrate compliance with SOX requirements; in other words, you cannot document who has access). To mitigate this situation, you must have a discovery process that extends to the cloud provider's APIs that identify any IAM roles that are created through any of the consoles, any self-service portal that allows for the same type of functionality to request access, as well as CI/CD integrations that require credentials to come from a vault versus being stored directly within the pipeline.
The best way to inventory non-human identities is through automated discovery tools that scan Active Directory, cloud IAM platforms, Kubernetes clusters, certificate stores, and CI/CD pipelines in real time.
Step-by-Step Inventory Approach:
Manual spreadsheets cannot scale to environments with hundreds of thousands of machine identities.
Identify shadow service accounts and over-privileged roles, audit API keys and map ownership.
Auditing non-human identities requires visibility into permissions, ownership, and actual usage patterns.
Audit & Certification Process:
Without formal certification, machine credentials become invisible compliance risks.
Identity inventory is the systematic cataloging of all non-human identities across the infrastructure, labeling characteristics and maintaining catalogs as continuously updated sources of truth. If you cannot see an identity, you cannot govern it.
The principle of least privilege states that identities should be assigned the least amount of permissions actually needed. Troubleshooting friction encourages and provides an incentive for over-permissioning, as error analysis can take hours, while granting admin rights immediately eliminates any errors present. Adding to the complexity of least privilege implementation is the permissioning of cloud services, with AWS IAM providing more than 10,000 permissions across 300 unique services.
Implementation needs the analysis of any use of permission. Cloud access analyzers provide the capability to see what IAM actions were actually attempted. Database schemes may allow audit logs to capture the actual SQL statements. Policy-based provisioning can map application archetypes to predefined permission sets. Just-in-time access allows for elevated permissions for a temporary time, rather than a permanent time. Lastly, the separation of duties needs to be implemented in order to prevent the same identity from completing sensitive operations on their own if compromised.
Credential rotation systematically replaces credentials on regular schedules, limiting the lifespan during which any credential remains valid. According to IBM, average breach identification takes 204 days with an additional 73 days to contain (a total of 277 days). Automated rotation policies ensure credentials discovered during investigations are likely already invalid.
Implementation must include secrets management integration. Passwords for applications are retrieved from vaults at runtime instead of configuration files. The rotation workflows create new passwords and update and/or create databases to accept either the old passwords or the new passwords, update the vaults, signal the application to refresh credentials in memory, and remove old passwords after validation periods. The certificate lifecycle automation monitors validity periods and automatically renews certificates before expiration. The API key rotation enforces maximum lifespans using an automated workflow. SSH key rotation requires users to generate new SSH keys on a recurring schedule with automation to update files across a fleet of servers.
Secure vaults serve as centralized, safe storage for credentials, in addition to providing encrypted storage, access controls, audit logging, and dynamic secret generation. Applications have traditionally stored credentials in source code, config files, or environment variables. Centralized vaults change the model where the credentials are stored in a single secure location, and applications access those credentials at runtime.
Vault features include encryption at rest and during transit, access control policies that specify which applications are allowed to retrieve which secrets, audit logging that captures when and what secrets are accessed, dynamic secret generation to avoid storing static credentials, and secret versioning that retains version history of credential changes.
The implementation workflow follows a series of steps that can include migrating secrets from a previous store by systematically discovering all the secrets within an application, loading the vault with secrets following a structured hierarchy and policy path, refactoring the application code, updating the application code to access secrets from the vault, verifying that the migration process was successful, and revoking secrets by removing secrets from the previous store.
Anomaly detection with non-human identities consists of establishing behavioral baselines to define normal authentication and activity behavior and then looking for indications that those credentials have been compromised (through deviations from the baseline).
To establish baselines, it is necessary to capture authentication behaviors (i.e., frequency, timing, and source of authentication), access behaviors (i.e., what resources were accessed), and privileged behaviors (i.e., how the permission granted was utilized). Machine learning algorithms take authentication log data over the baseline period of 90 days and establish statistical models.
Behavioral anomaly detection identifies anomalies based on actor time, source of authentication, access of resources, privilege escalation behavior (attempts to leverage more than the permissions assigned), and data exfiltration behavior (movement of data outside of expected behavior). Monitored behavior must also be coordinated with a response. This requires the automated routing of alerts, directing deviations to the appropriate teams; alerts with context that help fuel the investigative basis; and automated response capabilities through suspending credentials, forcing credential rotation, and restricting access.
Zero Trust is a security framework that assumes breach and verifies every access request, regardless of source. Traditional network security relied on perimeter-based trust. Zero Trust is the opposite of network-based trust, where every access request is verified.
The Zero Trust principles for NHI include verifying explicitly (every authentication has to be verified against a predefined policy), least privilege access (grants only minimum required permissions), and assuming breach (control is designed to expect an attacker will compromise some credentials).
Implementing Zero Trust involves requiring mutual authentication (both entities to be verified through mutual TLS), continuous authentication (replacing the concept of a one-time authentication with ongoing verification), policy enforcement points (evaluating an access request against an established policy before granting access), risk-based authentication (allowing an analyst to evaluate permissions based on a dynamic risk assessment), and microsegmentation (to contain or limit lateral movement through network based controls).
Identity management for non-human entities is an extension of identity governance and administration for human users to machine credentials. It provides identities as service accounts, API keys, certificates, and workload identities with the same systematic lifecycle management, policy enforcement, access certification, and auditing capabilities of identity management that has historically been applied to employee accounts.
Enterprises have worked for decades to establish and refine employee access governance with formal provisioning workflows, role-based access control, quarterly access reviews, and automated deprovisioning. Today, with approximately 450,000 machine identities compared to just 15,000 employees (the ratio is 30:1), it is hard to maintain informal management and governance of non-human identities.
Enterprise non-human identity management software provides automated discovery, lifecycle governance, secrets management integration, and continuous compliance monitoring.
Key Capabilities to Look For:
Organizations evaluating non-human identity management solutions should prioritize scalability, automation, and integration with DevOps pipelines.
| Capability | Traditional IAM | NHIM |
|---|---|---|
| Focus | Human users | Machine identities |
| Lifecycle trigger | HR events | App deployment |
| Authentication | Password + MFA | API keys, certs, tokens |
| Access reviews | Manager-led | Technical owner-led |
| Rotation | Password reset | Automated credential rotation |
| Compliance scope | User access | User + machine governance |
Ensuring the security of non-human identities in the future requires machine credentials to be treated equally to human workforce accounts through integrated platforms, automated lifecycles, and contextual access controls. Organizations can no longer manage human identities and machine identities separately, as machine identities can outnumber humans 45 to 1. Having total visibility of all identities is key to success; applying the least privilege principle consistently and implementing Zero Trust principles across both types of identities is key to success.
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Examples include service accounts, API keys, OAuth tokens, TLS certificates, SSH keys, AWS IAM roles, Azure Managed Identities, Kubernetes service accounts, and RPA bots.
Non-human identity authentication refers to programmatic methods such as API keys, certificates, OAuth tokens, IAM roles, and mutual TLS that allow machines to authenticate without human interaction.
Non-human identity management software automates the discovery, governance, lifecycle management, and compliance reporting of machine credentials across hybrid environments.
A digital credential used by machines, applications, or automated services to authenticate without human involvement, including service accounts, API keys, certificates, and tokens.
They enable automation and scalability modern IT requires but create security risks through over-permissioning, credential exposure, and lack of lifecycle management when ungoverned.
Programmatically by developers through cloud consoles, API calls, Infrastructure-as-Code templates, or CI/CD pipelines during application development and deployment.
Applying identity governance principles to machine credentials, including systematic discovery, lifecycle management, policy-based access control, regular reviews, credential rotation, and monitoring.
Over-privileged accounts (42% have admin privileges per CyberArk), hardcoded secrets (10 million+ exposed annually per GitGuardian), lack of lifecycle management (68% can't inventory accounts per CyberArk), and insufficient monitoring.
API keys every 90 days, service account passwords every 60-90 days, certificates 30-45 days before expiration, and non-SSH keys annually (or use certificate-based SSH with 8-24 hour validity).
Not traditional MFA, but organizations can implement equivalent controls through certificate-based authentication, mutual TLS, dynamic secrets from vaults, and context-aware authentication.
Through automated discovery across hybrid infrastructure, lifecycle automation tied to application deployment, policy-based access control enforcing least privilege, access certification campaigns including NHIs, secrets management integration, identity analytics detecting anomalies, and compliance reporting for SOX, HIPAA, and GDPR.
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A Digital Marketing Strategist who makes complex identity governance accessible to security and technology leaders through clear, data-driven content. Her insight-led, audience-focused approach supports Tech Prescient's mission of redefining identity security for modern enterprises.
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